13 195 4567 6711 58.75 10.88
1 8 287 441 40.43 16.53 In the first place I've never suggested that Cuba was lost except for the present. In my speech last night I indicated that I thought that Cuba one day again would be free. Where I've been critical of the Administration's policy, and where I criticized Mr. Nixon, was because in his press conference in Havana in 1955, he praised the competence and stability of the bicta - bict - Batista dictatorship - that dictatorship had killed over twenty thousand Cubans in seven years. Secondly, I did not criticize him for not calling for free elections. What I criticized was the failure of the Administration to use its great influence to persuade the Cuban government to hold free elections, particularly in 1957 and 1958. Thirdly, Arthur Gardner, a Republican Ambassador, Earl Smith, a Republican Ambassador, in succession - both have indicated in the past six weeks that they reported to Washington that Castro was a Marxist, that Raul Castro was a Communist, and that they got no effective results. Instead our aid continued to Batista, which was ineffective; we never were on the side of freedom; we never used our influence when we could have used it most effectively - and today Cuba is lost for freedom. I hope some day it will rise; but I don't think it will rise if we continue the same policies toward Cuba that we did in recent years, and in fact towards all of Latin America - when we've almost ignored the needs of Latin America; we've beamed not a single Voice of America program in Spanish to all of Latin America in the last eight years, except for the three months of the Hungarian uh - revolution.
2 18 440 626 61.66 10.73 Mr. Morgan, I suggested that if the United States felt that it could save the summit conference that it would have been proper for us to have expressed regrets. In my judgment that statement has been distorted uh - by Mr. Nixon and others in their debates around the country and in their discussions. Mr. Lodge, on "Meet the Press" a month ago, said if there was ever a case when we did not have law an our side it was in the U-2 incident. The U-2 flights were proper from the point of view of protecting our security. But they were not in accordance with international law. And I said that I felt that rather than tell the lie which we told, rather than indicate that the flights would continue - in fact, I believe Mr. Nixon himself said on May fifteenth that the flights would continue even though Mr. Herter testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that they had been canceled as of May twelfth - that it would have been far better that if we had expressed regrets, if that would have saved the summit, and if the summit is useful - and I believe it is. The point that is always left out is the fact that we expressed regrets to Castro this winter; that we expressed regrets - the Eisenhower Administration expressed regrets - for a flight over Southern Russia in 1958. We expressed regrets for a flight over Eastern Germany under this Administration. The Soviet Union in 1955 expressed regrets to us over the Bering Sea incident. The Chinese Communists expressed regrets to us over a plane incident in 1956. That is the accepted procedure between nations; and my judgment is that we should follow the advice of Theodore Roosevelt: Be strong; maintain a strong position; but also speak softly. I believe that in those cases where international custom calls for the expression of a regret, if that would have kept the summit going, in my judgment it was a proper action. It's not appeasement. It's not soft. I believe we should be stronger than we now are. I believe we should have a stronger military force. I believe we should increase our strength all over the world. But I don't confuse words with strength; and in my judgment if the summit was useful, if it would have brought us closer to peace, that rather than the lie that we told - which has been criticized by all responsible people afterwards - it would have been far better for us to follow the common diplomatic procedure of expressing regrets and then try to move on.
3 15 285 444 55.75 10.20 Well, Mr. Nixon hasn't discussed the two basic questions: what is going to be done and what will be his policy on implementing the Supreme Court decision of 1954? Giving aid to schools technically that are trying to carry out the decision is not the great question. Secondly, what's he going to do to provide fair employment? He's been the head of the Committee on Government Contracts that's carried out two cases, both in the District of Columbia. He has not indicated his support of an attempt to provide fair employment practices around the country, so that everyone can get a job regardless of their race or color. Nor has he indicated that he will support Title Three, which would give the Attorney General additional powers to protect Constitutional rights. These are the great questions: equality of education in school. About two percent of our population of white people are - is illiterate, ten per cent of our colored population. Sixty to seventy percent of our colored children do not finish high school. These are the questions in these areas that the North and South, East and West are entitled to know. What will be the leadership of the president in these areas to provide equality of opportunity for employment? Equality of opportunity in the field of housing, which could be done on all federal supported housing by a stroke of the president's pen. What will be done to provide equality of education in all sections of the United States? Those are the questions to which the president must establish a moral tone and moral leadership. And I can assure you that if I'm elected president we will do so.
4 12 325 519 44.25 13.82 Of course Mr. Nixon is wholly inaccurate when he says that the Congress has not provided more funds in fact than the President recommended for national defense. Nineteen fifty-three we tried to put an appropriation of five billion dollars for our defenses. I was responsible for the amendment with Senator Monroney in 1954 to strengthen our ground forces. The Congress of the United States appropriated six hundred and seventy-seven million dollars mare than the President was willing to use up till a week ago. Secondly, on the question of our position in the United Nations. We all know about the vote held this week - of the five neutralists - and it was generally regarded as a defeat for the United States. Thirdly, in 1952, there were only seven votes in favor of the admission of Red China into the United Nations. Last year there were twenty-nine and tomorrow when the preliminary vote is held you will see a strengthening of that position or very closely to it. We have not maintained our position and our prestige. A Gallup Poll taken in February of this year asking the - in eight out of nine countries - they asked the people, who do they think would be ahead by 1970 militarily and scientifically, and a majority in eight of the nine countries said the Soviet Union would be by 1970. Governor Rockefeller has been far more critical in June of our position in the world than I have been. The Rockefeller Brothers report, General Ridgway, General Gavin, the Gaither Report, various reports of Congressional committees all indicate that the relative strength of the p - United States both militarily, politically, psychologically, and scientifically and industrially - the relative strength of the so - of United States compared to that of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists together - has deteriorated in the last eight years and we should know it, and the American people should be told the facts.
5 23 539 795 58.27 10.95 Yes. We have been wholly indifferent to Latin America until the last few months. The program that was put forward this summer, after we broke off the sugar quota with Cuba, really was done because we wanted to get through the O.A.S. meeting a condemnation of Russian infiltration of Cuba. And therefore we passed an authorization - not an aid bill - which was the first time, really, since the Inter-American Bank which was founded a year ago was developed, that we really have looked at the needs of Latin America; that we have associated ourselves with those people. Secondly, I believe that in the ca - that it's far better for the United States, instead of concentrating our aid, particularly in the underdeveloped world, on surplus military equipment - we poured three hundred million dollars of surplus military equipment into Laos. We paid more military aid, more aid into Laos po - per - per person than in any country in the world and we ought to know now that Laos is moving from neutralism in the direction of the Communists. I believe instead of doing that, we should concentrate our aid in long-term loans which these people can pay back either in hard money or in local currency. This permits them to maintain their self-respect. It permits us to make sure that the projects which are invested in are going to produce greater wealth. And I believe that in cases of India and Africa and Latin America that this is where our emphasis should be. I would strengthen the Development Loan Fund. And Senator Fulbright, Senator Humphrey and I tried to do that. We tried to provide an appropriation of a billion and a half for five years, on a long-term loan basis, which this Administration opposed. And unless we're ready to carry out programs like that in the sixties, this battle for economic survival which these people are waging are going to be lost. And if India should lose her battle, with thirty-five per cent of the people of the underdeveloped world within her borders, then I believe that the balance of power could move against us. I think the United States can afford to do these things. I think that we could not afford not to do these things. This goes to our survival. And here in a country which if it is moving ahead, if it's developing its economy to the fullest - which we are not now - in my judgment, we'll have the resources to meet our military commitments and also our commitments overseas. I believe it's essential that we do it because in the next ten years the balance of power is going to begin to move in the world from one direction or another - towards us or towards the Communists - and unless we begin to identify ourselves not only with the anti-Communist fight, but also with the fight against poverty and hunger, these people are going to begin to turn to the Communists as an example. I believe we can do it. If we build our economy the way we should, we can afford to do these things and we must do it.
6 17 325 482 61.96 9.37 Well Mr. Nixon has stated the record inaccurately in regard to the depressed area bill. I'm very familiar with it. It came out of the committee of which I was the chairman - the labor subcommittee - in fifty-five. I was the floor manager. We passed an area redevelopment bill far more effective than the bill the Administration suggested, on two occasions, and the President vetoed it both times. We passed a bill again this year in the cong - in the Senate and it died in the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives. Let me make it very clear that the bill that Mr. Nixon talked about did not mention Wilkes-Barre or Scranton; it did not mention West Virginia. Our bill was far more effective. The bill introduced and erd - sponsored by Senator Douglas was far more effective in trying to stimulate the economy of those areas. Secondly, he has mentioned the problem of our older citizens. I cannot still understand why this Administration and Mr. Nixon oppose putting medical care for the aged under Social Security to give them some security. Third, I believe we should step up the use of our surplus foods in these areas until we're able to get the people back to work. Five cents a day - that's what the food package averages per person. Fourthly, I believe we should not carry out a hard money, high interest rate policy which helped intensify certainly the recession of 1958, and I think helped bring the slow-down of 1960. If we move into a recession in sixty-one, then I would agree that we have to put more money into the economy, and it can be done by either one of the two methods discussed. One is by ex - the programs such as aid to education. The other would be to make a judgment on what's the most effective tax program to stimulate our economy.
7 25 549 797 61.73 10.10 Well I understood that this was the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration according to all the Republican uh - propaganda that I've read. The question is what we're going to do in the future. I've been critical of this Administration and I've been critical of the President. In fact uh - Mr. Nixon uh - discussed that a week ago in a speech. I believe that our power and prestige in the last eight years has declined. Now what is the issue is what we're going to do in the future. Now that's an issue between Mr. Nixon and myself. He feels that we're moving ahead uh - in a - we're not going into a recession in this country, economically; he feels that our power and prestige is stronger than it ever was relative to that of the Communists, that we're moving ahead. I disagree. And I believe the American people have to make the choice on November eighth between the view of whether we have to move ahead faster, whether what we're doing now is not satisfactory, whether we have to build greater strength at home and abroad and Mr. Nixon's view. That's the great issue. President Eisenhower moves from the scene on January twentieth and the next four years are the critical years. And that's the debate. That's the argument between Mr. Nixon and myself and on that issue the American people have to make their judgment and I think it's a important judgment. I think in many ways this election is more important than any since 1932, or certainly almost any in this century. Because we disagree very fundamentally on the position of the United States, and if his view prevails then I think that's going to bring an important result to this country in the sixties. If our view prevails that we have to do more, that we have to make a greater national and international effort, that we have lost prestige in Latin America - the President of Brazil - the new incumbent running for office called on Castro during his campaign because he thought it was important to get the vote of those who were supporting Castro in Latin America. In Africa, the United States has ignored Latin uh - Africa. We gave more scholarships to the Congo - this summer we offered them - than we've given to all of Africa the year before. Less than two hundred for all the countries of Africa and they need trained leadership more than anything. We've been uh - having a very clear decision in the last eight years. Mr. Nixon has been part of that Administration. He's had experience in it. And I believe this Administration has not met its responsibilities in the last eight years, that our power relative to that of the Communists is declining, that we're facing a very hazardous time in the sixties, and unless the United States begin to move here - unless we start to go ahead - I don't believe that we're going to meet our responsibility to our own people or to the cause of freedom. I think the choice is clear and it involves the future.
8 11 292 415 59.66 11.53 I have no disagreement with the Vice President's position on that. It - my view is the same as his. Let me say there is only one uh - point I would add. That before we go into the summit, before we ever meet again, I think it's important that the United States build its strength; that it build its military strength as well as its own economic strength. If we negotiate from a position where the power balance or wave is moving away from us, it's extremely difficult to reach a successful decision on Berlin as well as the other questions. Now the next president of the United States in his first year is going to be confronted with a very serious question on our defense of Berlin, our commitment to Berlin. It's going to be a test of our nerve and will. It's going to be a test of our strength. And because we're going to move in sixty-one and two, partly because we have not maintained our strength with sufficient vigor in the last years, I believe that before we meet that crisis, that the next president of the United States should send a message to Congress asking for a revitalization of our military strength, because come spring or late in the winter we're going to be face to face with the most serious Berlin crisis since l949 or fifty. On the question of the summit, I agree with the position of Mr. Nixon. I would not meet Mr. Khrushchev unless there were some agreements at the secondary level - foreign ministers or ambassadors - which would indicate that the meeting would have some hope of success, or a useful exchange of ideas.
9 1 3 3 119.19 -2.62 That's right.
10 18 502 727 56.01 12.38 Well I don't think that in the winter of sixty-one under present economic conditions, it uh - a - uh - tax uh - increase would be desirable. In fact, it would be deflationary; it would cause great unemployment; it would cause a real slowdown in our economy. If it ever becomes necessary, and is wise economically and essential to our security, I would have no hesitancy in suggesting a tax increase or any other policy which would defend the United States. I have talked in every speech about the fact that these are going to be very difficult times in the nineteen-sixties and that we're going to have to meet our responsibilities as citizens. I'm talking about a national mood. I'm talking about our willingness to bear any burdens in order to maintain our own freedom and in order to meet our freedom around the globe. We don't know what the future's going to bring. But I would not want anyone to elect me uh - president of the United States - or vote for me - under the expectation that life would be easier if I were elected. Now, many of the programs that I'm talking about - economic growth, care for the aged, development of our natural resources - build the strength of the United States. That's how the United States began to prepare for its great actions in World War II and in the post-war period. If we're moving ahead, if we're providing a viable economy, if our people have sufficient resources so that they can consume what we produce; then this country's on the move, then we're stronger, then we set a better example to the world. So we have the problem of not only building our own uh - military strength and extending uh - our policies abroad, we have to do a job here at home. So I believe that the policies that I recommend came under the general heading of strengthening the United States. We're using our steel capacity fifty-five per cent today. We're not able to consume what we're able to produce at a time when the Soviet Union is making great economic gains. And all I say is, I don't know what the sixties will bring - except I think they will bring hard times in the uh - international sphere; I hope we can move ahead here at home in the United States; I'm confident we can do a far better job of mobilizing our economy and resources in the United States. And I merely say that they - if they elect me president, I will do my best to carry the United States through a difficult period; but I would not want people to elect me because I promised them the easy, soft life. I think it's going to be difficult; but I'm confident that this country can meet its responsibilities.
11 14 347 505 58.56 11.25 Well, Mr. Nixon uh - I'll just give you the testimony of Mr. George Aiken - Senator George Aiken, the ranking minority member - Republican member - and former chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee testifying in 1959 - said there were twenty-six million Americans who did not have the income to afford a decent diet. Mr. Benson, testifying on the food stamp plan in 1957, said there were twenty-five million Americans who could not afford a elementary low-cost diet. And he defined that as someone who uses beans in place of meat. Now I've seen a good many hundreds of thousands of people who are uh - not adequately fed. You can't tell me that a surplus food distribution of five cents po - per person - and that n - nearly six million Americans receiving that - is adequate. You can't tell me that any one who uses beans instead of meat in the United States - and there are twenty-five million of them according to Mr. Benson - is well fed or adequately fed. I believe that we should not compare what our figures may be to India or some other country that has serious problems but to remember that we are the most prosperous country in the world and that these people are not getting adequate food. And they're not getting in many cases adequate shelter. And we ought to try to meet the problem. Secondly, Mr. Nixon has continued to state - and he stated it last week - these fantastic figures of what the Democratic budget would c - uh - platform would cost. They're wholly inaccurate. I said last week I believed in a balanced budget. Unless there was a severe recession - and after all the worst unbalanced budget in history was in 1958, twelve billion dollars - larger than in any Administration in the history of the United States. So that I believe that on this subject we can balance the budget unless we have a national emergency or unless we have a severe recession.
12 23 479 671 67.19 9.06 Well, the United States uh - has on occasion attempted uh - mostly in the middle fifties, to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to pull his troops back to Formosa. I believe strongly in the defense of Formosa. These islands are a few miles - five or six miles - off the coast of Red China, within a general harbor area and more than a hundred miles from Formosa. We have never said flatly that we will defend Quemoy and Matsu if it's attacked. We say we will defend it if it's part of a general attack on Formosa. But it's extremely difficult to make that judgment. Now, Mr. Herter in 1958, when he was Under Secretary of State, said they were strategically undefensible. Admirals Spruance and Callins in 1955 said that we should not attempt to defend these islands, in their conference in the Far East. General Ridgway has said the same thing. I believe that when you get into a w - if you're going to get into war for the defense of Formosa, it ought to be on a clearly defined line. One of the problems, I think, at the time of South Korea was the question of whether the United States would defend it if it were attacked. I believe that we should defend Formosa. We should come to its defense. To leave this rather in the air, that we will defend it under some conditions but not under other, I think is a mistake. Secondly, I would not suggest the withdrawal at the point of the Communist gun. It is a decision finally that the Nationalists should make and I believe that we should consult with them and attempt to work out a plan by which the line is drawn at the island of Formosa. It leaves a hundred miles between the sea. But with General Ridgway, Mr. Herter, General Collins, Admiral Spruance and many others, I think it's unwise to take the chance of being dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands which are not strategically defensible, which are not, according to their testimony, essential to the defense of Formosa. I think that uh - we should protect our commitments. I believe strongly we should do so in Berlin. I believe strongly we should d - do so in Formosa and I believe we should meet our commitments to every country whose security we've guaranteed. But I do not believe that that line in case of war should be drawn on those islands but instead on the island of Formosa. And as long as they are not essential to the defense of Formosa, it's been my judgment ever since 1954, at the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Far East, that our line should be drawn in the sea around the island itself.
13 10 194 286 62.42 9.37 Well, let me say I do think that parties are important in that they tell something about the program and something about the man. Abraham Lincoln was a great president of all the people; but he was selected by his party at a key time in history because his party stood for something. The Democratic party in this century has stood for something. It has stood for progress; it has stood for concern for the people's welfare. It has stood for a strong foreign policy and a strong national defense, and as a result, produced Wilson, President Roosevelt, and President Truman. The Republican party has produced McKinley and Harding, Coolidge, Dewey, and Landon. They do stand for something. They stand for a whole different approach to the problems facing this country at home and abroad. That's the importance of party; only if it tells something about the record. And the Republicans in recent years - not only in the last twenty-five years, but in the last eight years - have opposed housing, opposed care for the aged, opposed federal aid to education, opposed minimum wage and I think that record tells something.